Sydney's Anti-Eviction Movement: Community or Conspiracy?
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In the last week of June 1931, a doctor in a Sydney hospital was
surprised by a seven-year-old patient whose crushed toe had been
acquired in a novel fashion. The Sun reported:
'We was playin' evictions,' [the boy] fearfully told the doctor, 'and
I was a pleecemanan' 'e' - pointing to another small and grimy boy
- 'was a Communist. 'E threw a brick and it hit me on the toe.'
Yelling at the top of their voices, a dozen small boys in Simons
Street Newtown had staged a 'mock' battle between police and antievictionists.
Swinging sticks and firing imaginary revolvers the 'police'
routed the anti-evictionists' who, in desperation, began throwing
stones. l
As Iona and Peter Opie point out, the games and rituals of children
reveal' a thriving unselfconscious culture'.2 This culture pertains not
just to the children themselves, but to the lives of their families and
neighbours. In this game, the Newtown kids revealed the impact on
the whole community of the real anti-eviction battle which had taken
place in the suburb ten days earlier. And in the particular way in
which they adapted the traditional cops and robbers game, these little
boys revealed how much they knew about what had really happened.
After all, in the standard game, both sides would have imaginary
guns. Yet here- as in the real battles - only the police were shooting.
As the battle took place on a school day, the children must have
learned their information from listening to their parents.
While the anti-eviction campaign conducted by the Unemployed
Workers Movement (UWM) in Sydney in the first half of 1931 has
been studied as an expression of radicalism and militancy in the
Great Depression,3 this small-scale and localised movement also
provides a window into the way in which urban working class
communities functioned during the economic crisis. Yet if we are
taking the Newtown boys' game as oral historical evidence, it is
only fair to ask whether their parents knew what they were talking
about when they spoke of 'Communists'. Did they mean actual Party
members, or was this just a catch phrase borrowed from the
establishment press?
This question is crucial to whether or not the Sydney anti-eviction
movement can be seen as an expression of a working class
community, composed of individuals with free will and intelligence.
Alternatively, did it simply represent the actions of a tiny
revolutionary vanguard of the Communist Party of Australia during
the Third Period of organisation? Or was the campaign perhaps the
brainchild of a single Communist puppeteer? Indeed, were the wires
being pulled by the American double agent H. M. (Harry) Wicks
who, as Herbert Moore, was supposedly the Comintem's secret agent,
but who was really an FBI agent?4 Such a person could well attempt
to work as an agent provocateur, manipulating Party members into
extremist actions in the hope of instigating police repression or
ultimately even the banning of the Communist Party. Even more
strangely, were the police themselves trying to 'set up' the antievictionists by offering them arms or explosives, in order to justity
repression?
To attempt to search out the truth, we have to look to the
origins of the anti-eviction movement.
Certainly the UWM was established as a Communist

fratemal or front. While this was a national organisation, the executive
was based in Sydney - as of course was the Party Executive - but
front organisations were set up to work at the level of local suburb
or country town, and were intended to attract working men and
women who were not CPA members. Indeed, in a directive explaining
the role of fratemals, the Party stressed:
It is important to note that none of these organisations are Communist.
Each has a specific role to fulfil; each has to be made into a broad
non-party mass organisation. Party members work inside each as
fractions - we do not aim to and repudiate attempts at mechanical
controL'

Of course, in theory the radical ising of workers through the' mass
organisations' was part of the preparation for the world wide
revolutionary struggle which would naturally occur as a culmination
of the Class Against Class battles of the Third Period. The initial
platform of the UWM was based on the unemployed program of the
Red International ofLahor Unions, adapted to Australian conditions. 6
Yet in practice, the annual marches on International Unemployed
Day were the only evidence that the organisation had a global policy.
On the practical level, the UWM could not function even as a national
organisation, because unemployed relief(whether dole orreIiefwork)
was given by state rather than federal governments. This meant that,
while there could be overall goals, partiCUlar policy and the tactics
adopted to implement that policy usually had to be developed at the
state level. Even in the one state, regional differences - between the
city and the bush, or between the rural towns and mining towns offered further opportunities for independence. A study of a number
of unemployed workers' campaigns at community level reveals that
for practical purposes, an alliance oflocal UWM groups would often
develop protest tactics in response to local circumstances or needs.
The South Coast Dole Riots of May 1931 are one such example7 ;
the Sydney anti-eviction campaign ofthe next month is yet another.
It almost goes without saying that the opposition to evictions
was national UWM policy. With the dole being given in the form of
goods or coupons rather than as cash, it was impossible for many
unemployed workers to pay rent. In working class suburbs, it was
common to see bailiffs dumping furniture onto the footpath, pushing
women and children onto the street. Even more common was the
sight of strings of boarded-up terrace houses, which nobody could
afford to rent. If anything demonstrated the idiocy as well as the
injustice of the capitalist system it was the fact that in many situations
the landlords did not even gain anything from evicting people.
And so from its inauguration in April 1930 the UWM pledged
itself against evictions. The policy was spelled out in July that year,
at the UWM's first major conference. Thus Demand #6 noted that
'All evictions of unemployed and seizures of fumiture and belongings
for failure to pay rent must be prohibited'; the 'Method' of
implementation was to:
Organise vigilance committees in neighbourhoods to patrol working
class districts and resist by mass action the eviction of unemployed
workers from their houses, or attempts on behalf of bailiffs to remove
furniture, or gas men to shut off the gas supply.8
On the last day ofthis conference - Monday 28 July 1930
- there was even an attempt to carry out Demand #6. This
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incident would provide a useful model for how not to conduct an
anti-eviction campaign. On this Monday morning, an unemployed
musician living in the beachside suburb of Clovelly was evicted,
along with his wife and eight children. A bailiff took possession of
their furniture and began to auction it. At the Unemployed Conference
at the Trades Hall, a note was handed to the platform; the speaker,
Bob Shayler, read out news of what was happening in Clovelly to
the two hundred or so participants', then asked what they intended
doing about it.
'We will beat up the bailiffs!' the people replied. 'We will stop
the eviction! 'Shayler then allegedly urged: 'I want twenty men who
are not afraid ofthe police to go out and stop the sale, and if the sale
is over to smash the house so they won't do it again.' Shayler would
deny having made such a call, and it is likely that at least some of
the urge for direct action came from Constables Cook and Neville,
the two undercover policemen who had been watching the
Communist Party for months, under orders to pick out the militants. 10
However the decision came about, a couple of dozen men caught
a tram to Clovelly. By now it was early afternoon, and the auction
was over; the evicted family as well as their possessions had gone.
Neighbours spotted the men's arrival, but the Sydney Morning Herald
would report that 'No one realised the seriousness of the situation
until the raiders were running away from the house'. Police would
later allege that the men rushed into the house and broke every door
and window, shattered mantelpieces and light fittings. After a
'remarkably brief time' they caught another tram back to the city. It
was only then that the neighbours rang the police. Some hours later,
police raided the Communist hall and 'selected the men they had
come to arrest'. A 'wild melee' broke out, and eventually eleven
prisoners were taken away. They would be charged with malicious
damage to the value of 40 pounds.
A fortnight later, when the case came up, seven more men were
added to the list (and one original name was dropped). Meanwhile
Shayler and another man had been separately charged with
incitement; they were sentenced to six months hard labour. Soon
four more men - including Jack Sylvester, leader of the Balmain
UWM - were added to the initial charge, so that when the malicious
damage case came up at Quarter Sessions in November there were
21 'Clovelly Boys' in the dock. All were convicted, although a
number including Sylvester had clearly not taken part in the event.
Good behaviour bonds for two years were offered as an alternative
to gaol sentences of six to eight months, but as these would stop
militancy, eleven men chose gaol. It is likely that the other ten men
were not Party members. II After a three week hunger strike and
wide public agitation, the recently elected Lang government was
forced to open an Inquiry Commission, and Sylvester and at least
one other prisoner were released. 12 Yet at the end of January 1931
ten still remained in gaol. 13
Overall, 'the Clovelly Frame Up' (as the Workers' Weekly dubbed
the event) cost the fledgling unemployed movement a great deal of
time and militant energy - and for absolutely no gain. Yet while the
spying, the trumped up charges, and the heavy sentences showed
the lengths to which the state would go in order to crush the UWM,
the moral of the story is contained in the description ofthe reactions
of the Clovelly neighbours when they saw a bunch of complete
strangers arrive in the street, race into the house, out again, and down
to the tram stop. Of course the local people didn't dob - at least not
till the men were away. But nor did they give the activity any moral,
let alone physical, support. As a spontaneous one-off action done
from outside, with absolutely no grassroots preparation of the
community, it was bound to fail.
By the opening of 1931 , the UWM was realising the need
to enact the 'method' proposed at the July Conference of

organising 'vigilance committees in neighbourhoods' in order to resist
eviction by 'mass action'.
In the early months of 1931, the Unemployed Workers'
Movement in New South Wales began building itself as a mass
organisation. At this same time, Jack Sylvester became UWM
National Secretary. Though Hall Greenland maintains that 'behind
the scenes the real controllers were the leaders of the Communist
Party, themselves acting under orders from Harry Wicks', 14 it is hard
to see the charismatic and independent Sylvester as anyone's puppet
or front guy. Eighteen months later he would move into an open
breach with the Party, 15 and it is likely that already Sylvester was in
disagreement with the hierarchy. Certainly the whole philosophy of
building from the suburban or community level was in keeping with
Sylvester's beliefs and with the practice of his own very successful
UWM local in Balmain.
According to the Workers' Weekly, over this February and March
new branches of the UWM were formed over a wide area of working
class Sydney - including outer suburbs such as Parramatta, Liverpool
and Granville in the west, Hurstville and Kogarah in the south west,
Bondi and Paddington in the east, and Crows Nest and Chatswood
on the north side of the harbour, as well as branches in the densely
populated inner suburbs such as Surry Hills and Glebe, Newtown
and Annandale. In some areas, such as Bankstown and Balmain, the
UWM was joined by 'formerly unaffiliated organisations' - either
the Labor Party's Unemployed Workers' Union or social welfare
groups.16
These local branches would usually have 'special interest
committees', such as an anti-eviction committee. An activist whether or not a Party member - might belong to two or three such
committees, or to another fraternal organisation, depending on his
or her interests, abilities and gender. For example, women would
probably also belong to the local Workers' International Relief(WIR)
group, which provided food or shelter or other practical help when
workers and their families were in need. And single men - often
those living at a UWM hostel in one ofthe inner Sydney suburbs would sometimes also join the local unit of the Workers' Defence
COrpS.17 As the middle word of its name suggests, the WDC aimed
to train a group which could ward off attacks - whether from the
police, or from the emerging New Guard, or indeed from a certain
strong arm gang associated with Jock Garden's ruling faction at the
Trades Hall. Though the organisation was meant to be developed
along military lines, at most it would only have included a couple of
hundred men, of whom perhaps 20 or 30 provided the militancy and
the muscle. Most recruits quickly left this Red version of Dad 's Army
in embarrassment or boredom, after spending a couple of Saturdays
drilling with sticks in the local park, followed by hours of Leninist
theory.
Though the UWM was scattered across Sydney's suburbs, to
some extent this movement should be seen as the expression of a
single working class community - composed of a number of
individual suburban communities, which in tum were made up of
people of diverse ages and backgrounds, and of both genders. The
links were made by the people themselves: the Sydney unemployed
movement did indeed move about. Without the price of a train or
bus fare, these people walked;I' without a radio, and without the
price of a ticket to the movies, these people talked. And as the
unemployed journeyed from suburb to suburb, they carried with them
various forms ofwhat could be dubbed 'infotainment'. Moving about,
gathering on street comers, visiting each other, gossiping, yarning,
singing, scribbling chalk messages onto pavements, passing on news
either orally or by way of a roughly printed news sheet what else was there to do all day? Through the first six months
of 1931, an increasingly exciting topic of conversation was

the UWM's campaign against evictions. And in some suburbs, a house
under an eviction order would provide a sort of clubhouse for a variety
of social and political get-togethers.
When word of a threatened eviction came to the anti-eviction
committee of a UWM branch, the decision about what sort of action
to take - and indeed whether to take action at all- was decided at
the branch level. The UWM was selective in deciding which cases
to fight, and was not willing to subject people unnecessarily to the
dangers of violence and arrests, or even to the time-consuming
business of deputations and protest meetings. For example, all the
disputed cases concerned families, though if the UWM were looking
for trouble it could more easily have mounted a militant protest over
the eviction of single men. In June the tabloid Smith Weekly ran a
comprehensive interview with Peters, secretary of the Redfern UWM,
who described the organisation's' eviction rules' as 'pretty stringent' .
He explained that: 'The anti eviction committee first of all makes
searching inquiries as to the bona fides of each case before we agree
to lend our support.' Peters had earned 1000 pounds a year in the
piano trade before the Depression, and was openly anti-Communist:

s

Our members are not scarlet-died, fire-eating Communists, as people
seem to think. They're just ordinary decent fellows out of work, and
all they ask is a fair deaL .. I don't deny that a few extreme Reds
have wormed their way into our organisation, as they have wormed
in everywhere. But they are entirely in the minority, and we are
doing our utmost to bump them out. 19
At the risk of moving a little ahead in the story, it should be pointed
out that the Redfern branch had recently been involved in the first
confrontation with police. Either Peters was a complete dupe, or the
movement really had a community base.
Through the early months of 1931, a number of different tactics
were used by different branches of the UWM. In January, for example,
a deputation accompanied by a protest meeting was enough to change
the minds of the owners in cases at Glebe, Annandale, Granville,
Waverley, and three cases at Balmain.2° Sometimes the methods of
persuasion may have included veiled threats, with a few WDC
members as potential enforcers. Thus in April the eviction committee
of the Bondi-Waverley UWM (which had its own WDC group)
accompanied a tenant to a meeting with an agent who planned to
issue an eviction order. The committee reported that 'matters were
explained' to the agent 'in no uncertain manner on what action we
were prepared to put into operation'. The tenant was allowed to stay
in the house, and his rent was reduced from 25 shillings to five
shillings a week. 21
Another common tactic, called 'picketing', obviously developed
from the union practice of gathering at a factory gate. In this variation,
pickets would mount a sustained protest on the footpath outside the
threatened house. This happened in April in the outer western suburb
of Granville. After ten days, the UWM called a truce to discuss terms
offered by the owners and a few days later the picket was called off
because a mass meeting had decided that the tenant should accept
the owner's offer of another cottage and removal expenses, although
the tenant himself wanted the fight to continue. In this case it is
again clear that the UWM had a community base. Though the branch
secretary, Bateman, was a Communist, he declared that of the 500
members of the branch, only 17 were members of the Party. And a
Granville ALP alderman agreed that 'there were a number of
Communists in the movement, but they were not in control' .22 This
tactic was familiar to trade unionists, and it fitted the sociable nature
of the unemployed movement. Women could join in and children
could play on the street. If it rained, the pickets could move off the
footpath and gather on the veranda. It would only seem a small
step between picketing outside, and picketing inside - and
indeed the word 'pickets' was used interchangeably for

defenders inside the houses and demonstrators outside. Often too
the pickets themselves would be interchangeable, with men rostered
at different times to take a turn inside, or out on the line. 23
The first record of picketing inside a Sydney house is a case in
Surry Hills in late February. The tactic came about when bailiffs
acting for the real estate company made two attempts to gain
possession of the house over the weekend. After receiving legal
advice that 'any time was legal, and any trick could be used to gain
entry' the Surry Hills UWM decided it was 'necessary' for members
'to remain on the premises in sufficient numbers to at any time defeat
any attempt by police or bailiffs to gain admittance'. As well as
occupying the house with a constant group of pickets, the UWM
continued to hold mass meetings at the scene every day. These were
attended by large numbers of local residents. A WIR committee
provided food for the pickets, and there were contributions of food,
tobacco and even cash from local shopkeepers and those lucky
enough to have a job. This went on for two or three weeks. 24
An occupation in the south western suburb of Lakemba in May
also aroused considerable popular support. The Sydney Morning
Herald reported that after the first mass meeting at the house,
hundreds of unemployed from the whole district 'paraded' through
the streets ofthis and neighbouring suburbs, including Bankstown.
After the pickets had remained in the house a week, the owner decided
that the tenant could remain rent free until he found work. 2S As well
as offering an escape from the demoralisation of unemployment
through action, the activities around the houses provided a welcome
social outlet in these bleak times. When the Lakemba occupation
was concluded, a participant wrote: 'Many of the pickets are sorry
the siege is over. Every night a concert was held on the front lawn,
followed by lectures and debates. '26
Overall, the combination of tactics was so successful that the
UWM in Sydney won every single eviction case which it took on
during the first five months of 1931.27 Towards the end of May, houses
were being occupied in at least six suburbs - Redfern, Leichhardt,
Bankstown, Newtown, Glebe and Guildford. In the face of swelling
community feeling, it is little wonder if the large rental companies
became anxious. The Workers Weekly would later claim that the
landlords held a delegation to Premier Lang, asking him to use the
police to enforce evictions. 28 There is no evidence ofthis, and indeed
it appears that the Labor Government was loathe to involve the state
forces in the embarrassing situation of putting workers' families onto
the streets. Chief Secretary Gosling would state in Parliament that
he had 'repeatedly made representations to the magistrates urging
them not to issue these [ejectment] orders to the police but to the
bailiffs'.29 Perhaps the magistrates were under pressure from the
landlords to protect the rights of property owners.30 Whatever the
case, from the end of May, the courts began to direct the police to
enforce the orders,31 Many members of the police force were only
too happy to take on the job.
There is no room here to go into a blow by blow account ofthe
increasingly confrontational eviction battles which broke out
successively in Redfern on Saturday May 30, Leichhardt on Friday
5 June, Bankstown on Wednesday 17 June, and in Newtown two
days later. In the light of recurring conspiracy theories, it is timely to
take a close look at who was involved in these battles, both as
participants and behind the scenes.
We return firstly to the question of the role of the Communist
Party hierarchy. In his history of the CPA, Stuart Macintyre notes
that 'there were major confrontations in Sydney during 1931 after
[the Party's] political bureau pronounced the anti-eviction campaign
"the main point of struggle"'; these politbureau
pronouncements are dated 13 May and 20 June.32 This is true
in a way, but were these pronouncements a directive, or simply
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a record offact? By the second week of May, the campaign had well
and truly taken off at local level. By 20 June, the four bloody battles
had taken place. So if the Party did order the occupations of houses,
the order was not given in this form.
An additional argument in favour of the local or communitybased nature of this movement is the fact that it erupted at this time
only in Sydney. After all, the CPA was a national party, and if the
directive had come from above, then we should expect to find antieviction occupations in other places in the first half of 1931- either
in other cities such as Melbourne, or in New South Wales coal towns.
But perhaps, as Hall Greenland suggests, the whole campaign
was due to H. M. Wicks:
In mid-1931, in order to expose the perfidious nature of the new
Labor Government, Wicks decided to hold a series of pitched battles
with police over evictions. Houses with impending eviction orders
in the Sydney suburbs of Bankstown and Newtown, and another in
Newcastle, were barricaded and sandbagged. 'Labor's' police were
then challenged to dislodge the mostly imported Communist
defenders. The police rose to the challenge with great brutality and
while the bashings outraged Labor supporters in those suburbs, no
effort was made by the UWM - nor could be made, for they were
social fascists - to involve those Labor supporters in the defence of
these suburban Alamos. Sylvester was unhappy with this ultraleftism and the crass Party manipulation it represented. 33
Even leaving aside the fact that the bloody Newcastle battle at
Tighes Hill occurred a year later, in June 1932, it is hard to accept
this interpretation. It is probably reasonable that no evidence is cited
for Wicks's decision: double agents no doubt don't leave a lot of
paperwork. However, if the whole thing was planned as a trap to
lure the police into a confrontation, it is curious that the May issues
of the Workers' Weekly give no hint that the eviction campaign is
coming to a head. No public call was ever made to occupy houses,
and through May and even June the only tactic advised was to form
anti-eviction committees and hold mass meetings. While the
barricading only began after the police (with batons and revolvers
drawn 34) broke into the Redfern house, a careful study of each battle
shows a gradual escalation of fortifications and weapons, as if the
pickets were developing the occupation tactic in response to
information passed along the community grapevine, rather than
blindly obeying one man's orders.
The reference to 'mostly imported Communist defenders' is
misleading. The three men arrested in the scrimmage at Redfern
included the young Koori, Noel Eatock, whose brother Dick would
soon be arrested at Bankstown, and who would himself be arrested
on false charges in the Glebe Dole Riot in October of the next year.
In mid 1931, the Eatock boys were probably Communists, but this
family was not known for toeing party lines. The boys' mother - a
former member of the Industrial Workers of the World, or Wobblies
- was at this time a member ofthe ALP as well as being a member of
the UWM Executive. 35 Jack Sylvester may have become unhappy
with the ultra-leftism ofthe anti-eviction battles, but it was his support
for the Eatock family which would lead to his own split with the
Party after the Glebe Dole Riot.
A study ofthe backgrounds of other anti-eviction activists reveals
a similarly complex situation. Half a dozen of the 16 Bankstown
Boys (including Dick Eatock) lived in the local area, and others came
from Lidcombe, Belmore and Clyde as well as suburbs closer to the
CPA's city headquarters. But the issue of where the pickets lived is
irrelevant, because the unemployed community crossed suburban
boundaries. 36 As to the political affiliations of these 16, it is clear
that the 17-year-old Alexander Mackaroff was a complete
political naive, who simply came to the house on the previous
night because he'd been invited to play his violin. 37 A couple

of others (Jack Hansen and Andrew 'Scotty' Thompson) were former
Wobblies, as was 'Joe' Griffen the secretary of the Bankstown UWM.
Parsons, the tenant,J8 was a very new member of the Communist
Party and WDC; more significantly, he was a World War I digger.
Jack Hansen, John Terry and Claude Stevens were also veterans. An
equally diverse picture emerges from a study ofthe Newtown pickets.
Overall, these men (apart from Mackaroff) certainly shared a militant
commitment. Some were Communists. But they were not Party hacks.
If anything, they seem to have been acting despite the wishes of
their superiors. Soon the Party would attack the eviction fighters as
left adventurists. Within a year or so, Dick Eatock would even be
expelled from the Bankstown branch of the Young Communist
League. 39
Ifwe are looking for a conspiracy of imported agitators, it is at
least more colourful to follow a tale that surfaces in the oral accounts
collected by Audrey Johnson, and which reappears in Macintyre's
text as a description of some of the 'desperate types' who were
attracted to the Workers' Defence COrpS.40 Johnson gives the name
of this 'branch' of the WDC as 'the Irish Brigade', noting that they
'added the fruits of a long tradition of enmity to British authority to
working class dislike of the police'.
Following the rough treatment received in several eviction
demonstrations they began to collect arms; revolvers were all they
could get until someone brought some gelignite up from the south
coast mines ... Pickets were still fortifying the Bankstown house they
had occupied, and the Irish Brigade were preparing was preparing
to bring in its arms, when the police unexpectedly attacked, several
days before the eviction notice became legally operative. 41
It is true that at this time in Sydney there was a wild bunch of
boyos who liked to boast about the policemen whom they had shot
back in the Troubles, as well as naming the coppers and others whom
they planned to murder next Saturday night. Through the first six
months of 1931 the frequent meetings of these men were attended
by an undercover probationary constable, who reported their schemes
to Constables Cook and Neville (key players in the Clovelly Frame
Up) and to Sergeant Coombes, who in turn passed the paperwork up
the police hierarchy until it eventually reached the Commissioner.
This spying operation was initially intended to cover the Workers'
Defence Army (sic), and the reports continued to be headed 'Irish
Terrorists, Workers Defence Army etc', though from the first
memorandum onwards it is clear that the young policeman was
mostly concerned with the 'Irish' groUp.42
The meetings of these 'Irish Terrorists' were attended by about
six to eight regulars, with occasional visitors. At the time the file
was opened in late January 1931 the main players were sharing a
house in Surry Hills with Dave Williams, one of the organisers of
the Workers' Defence Corps. However, it would quickly become
clear that only a few of the men attended WDC meetings, and their
aim was to recruit 'the intelligent portion' of the WDC to their own
organisation. By the time of the second report - in mid February the group's 'headquarters' was in Redfern and towards the end of
June they were meeting in Annandale. The second report notes that
'Those who are members ofthe Communist Party do not believe in
the propaganda of that party'. Indeed, these men saw themselves as
being in competition with the CPA. Their own aim was 'to form a
workers' army to overthrow capitalism and install a republic' and
they resolved that 'all money stolen or obtained in any manner was
to be kept for the purpose of supporting the members of the
organisation, and not to be handed to the Communist Party, and nor
were they to be informed of the activities of this organisation'. They
felt that 'they had been let down by the Communist Party in
their previous attempts to do work' and complained that the
Party was 'against' a number of them. They feared that the

Party would 'denounce them to the police'. As well as this quasipolitical purpose, the group's aim was to payoff old scores. Thus
'They state their object is to murder all persons in authority who
have been in any way mixed with them and have turned on them'.
Over the months, the hit list would include Jock Garden, Jack Lang,
the Trades Hall guards Cable and Kelly, and the infamous Constable
Cook and Sergeant Coombes. The men claimed 'that they have means
of disposing of bodies which will never be detected. They consider
that this class of action would be the proper one to bring about a
revolution' .
From the beginning, some ofthe individuals boasted of knowing
how to get a stockpile of weapons. But there always seemed to be
some sort of hitch. For example, on 28 May there was talk of raiding
a military dump containing 150 rifles and eight submachine guns,
but on 4 June the men realised that they would first need to buy a
lorry, to transport the weapons, and they didn't have any money. Of
course once they had the rifles, 'it would be no trouble to hold up a
bank at any time'. There was also talk of knowing how to get
explosives from somewhere near Newcastle, but they never followed
this through either. On a couple of occasions, a member would
actually produce a weapon; one man had a revolver and pistol as
well as a short Lee Enfield Service Rifle. When the police traced the
rifle, it was found to have been issued 'to the AIF Reinforcements
proceeding overseas on the 9th February 1915'. Clearly, this gun
had gone to Gallipoli!
Yet perhaps the most extraordinary thing to emerge from these
extremely detailed reports is that none of the men - either the regular
group or the occasional visitors - ever mentioned attending any of
the four eviction battles. Nor do the names of any of the men ever
tum up in the lists of those arrested in anti-eviction protests (or indeed
in other unemployed demonstrations). In early March a few men,
said to be members of the WDC and CPA, showed off some water
pistols and bottles of ammonia which they implied were connected
with a 'recent proposed eviction' in Chapel Street WoolloomoolDo;
they planned to take them to the march for International Unemployed
Day, on 6 March. But this rally took place without incident. 43 Despite
the fact that for a couple of months the group's headquarters was in
Redfern, there was no mention of the eviction in that suburb. By the
time of the Leichhardt eviction, the group was meeting in the
adjoining suburb of Annandale, but they evidently didn't go along.
Three nights later, four of the men decided 'to bum down' the house
'from where the people were evicted'; this was to happen on Friday
12, 'late at night', when the new tenants were in bed. But 'the threat
to bum down the house was not carried out'.
The other crazy feature of these reports is that it is clear that the
police force was far more concerned with this group than it was with
the WDC or indeed with the anti-eviction movement. Though
reference to the Workers' Defence Army remained at the top of each
file, there was rarely mention of this organisation. Occasionally, there
would be a throwaway line at the end of a report, noting that 'Nothing
of any consequence has taken place with the WDrkers' Defence
Army'. On 26 May - four days before the police broke into the
Redfern house - the young probationary constable reported:
The Workers' Defence Army are at present engaged dealing with
eviction matters in the different suburbs, and have stated that they
are desirous of getting young Police sent there when they are
protecting a house so as they can annoy them and probably cause an
arrest to be made. Then they will illtreat the Policeman concerned.
They have said that old Police cannot be trapped in this manner.
Does this support some sort of idea that police were being lured
into houses? It sounds more like a joke. In fact, the WDe
wasn't protecting the Redfern house on 30 May because it
was holding its 'annual meeting' in the city. But the
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organisation no doubt did stage the rescue attempt which took place
half an hour afterwards - in which 30 men and women arrived in a
truck and tried to load up the tenant's furniture.'4 Police drew guns
again, and it was in the resulting melee that Noel Eatock and his two
companions were arrested. Yet on 1 June the spy laconically noted
that 'Nothing important has transpired with the Workers Defence
Army. They are still attending to eviction matters'. Perhaps something
can be discerned from a subsequent report of the WDC conference,
in which it was noted that 'The business at the present time is left in
the hands of the Central Executive'. Perhaps this does point to the
secret string-pulling role of the Party hierarchy and H. M. Wicks. A
few days later, on 9 June, the spy would note that 'The Workers
Defence Army is being re-organised and branches formed in every
suburb'. But he added: 'Nothing of importance has taken place
recently other than the picketing of houses (eviction matters).' And
on IS June - two days before the police stormed the Bankstown
house - Sergeant Coombes merely advised his superiors that 'The
Workers Defence Corps is still engaged in picketing houses in the
different suburbs - eviction cases.'
And what of the story that the Irish Brigade was preparing to
give arms and explosives to the Bankstown Boys, but was forestalled
when the police literally jumped the gun?4S On the night of
Wednesday 17 June - the day on which police had fired at pickets
inside the Bankstown house, and captured 16 bleeding and battered
prisoners - the Irish Terrorists apparently did not comment on the
day's events. Rather, they 'practically decided ... to rob a bookmaker's
house on Saturday night', but put off the actual 'arrangements' for
another meeting. Passing on this information to his superiors,
Sergeant Coombes added that 'The Workers Defence Corps are still
engaged picketing houses in the different suburbs, and are arming
themselves with clubs and iron bars for the purpose of fighting the
police'. No mention of other weapons!
At this point, the file abruptly ends.'6 But there is yet another
story, that after the Bankstown battle was over, one of the Irish
Brigade gave a gun to WDC leader, Mick Ryan, who - discovering
it to be a police gun, and assuming the owner to be an informer and
agent provocateur - arranged for the confiscation of all the weapons
of the Irish group; the guns were supposedly thrown into White Bay.47
This tale seems to connect with a story about an undercover
policeman who 'suggested the Party take reprisals for police
shootings at Bankstown by mining another house at Guildford with
explosives'. The Party naturally expelled him.4s It is quite possible
that the police were trying to raise the stakes in the anti-eviction
game. But if so - it was to no avail.
So was there nothing at Bankstown more dangerous than bricks
or lengths of lead pipe? In the records of the Closed Session of the
CPA's Central Committee Plenum, held the next January, some words
have been censored in a tantalising fashion. Evidently at the time of
the Bankstown campaign the Party had been informed that 1000
returned soldiers in the neighbourhood 'were so incensed that they
were prepared to offer [censored] resistance'. But though some Party
officials may have wanted to 'dramatise the situation' with a bit of
armed struggle, the point is that nothing happened: 16 pickets were
left to hold the fort. Beris Penrose comments that
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As divisions among defenders developed over the best tactics to
employ, it appears that one communist leader ordered the removal
of the weapon/weapons from the house. Although, as Moxon said, it
was 'never discovered who ordered [censored] to be taken out of
the house at Bankstown' .49
Nor, it might be added, was there any indication as to who had
ordered anything to be put into the house - if indeed it ever
was. But should it be a surprise if a gun had been present?
Once the police drew revolvers, it would perhaps be more
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surprising if someone didn't consider playing tit for tat. As well as
having war souvenirs, some unemployed had rifles for shooting
game. 50 But the real point of all this is that - despite opportunitiesno guns were ever used by the anti-evictionists, and no guns were
ever found in the houses when the police ransacked them after the
battles. Surely a siguificant reason for this lack of armed retaliation
was that, at heart, the anti-eviction movement was a community
movement. Out there in the street were neighbours, including woman
and children. An innocent bystander might get hurt.
Though occupying a house provided a useful focal point for a
range of political activity, the tactic worked overall because of the
gatherings of people outside, rather than the actual occupations. The
crowd is the most significant thing in these struggles.
At Leichhardt, there was a crowd of 200 supporters - women as
well as men. In the face of the police baton charge, some 'stood firm
and gave attack for attack' before being scattered down the steep
street. 51 At Bankstown, on the other hand, though 'the surrounding
streets were crowded', the wide paddocks around the house meant
that the crowd never had the same sense of purpose. After hearing
the gunshots people stayed at 'a safe distance'. There were even
some 'free fights' between onlookers. 52 But Newtown was proof of
support for the movement. In the long narrow street which hooks
between the major thoroughfares of Erskineville Road and King
Street, there gathered 'a crowd hostile to the police, numbering many
thousand'.
They filled the street for a quarter of a mile on each side of the
building until squads of police drove them back about 200 yards,
and police cordons were thrown across the roadway. At times the
huge crowd threatened to get out of hand. It was definitely hostile to
the police. When constables emerged from the back of the building
with their faces covered in blood, the crowd hooted and shouted
insulting remarks. When one patrol wagon containing prisoners was
being driven away, people standing well back in the crowd hurled
stones at the police driver. 53
Extraordinary though this report is, it must be realised that as
the crowd put up this determined show, the police were patrolling
them with drawn pistols and batons. Just a few minutes earlier, these
people had witnessed the police jump out of a bus and commence
firing on the eviction house, and the sound of gunfire and screaming
was continuing to come from inside the house.
So who were these resistant people in Union Street Newtown?
Were they Communist stooges? Hardly. In Sydney at this time the
CPA had at most 600 members - many of them (Wicks admitted)
'on paper only'.54 This is where Greenland's interpretation misses
the point. These people were Labor voters, and probably quite a few
were ALP members. It was the involvement of great numbers of
working class people in mass rallies around the houses that forced
Lang to realise that he would have to change the law to satisfy his
own voters.
On the day of the Newtown battle, the NSW Labor Caucus called
for an amendment to the Fair Rents Act 'without delay', and for
legislation to protect the unemployed against eviction. 55 The next
day, Jock Garden opened his pre-selection candidature for the seat
of Cook by promising that there would be no more evictions and
that the government would soon introduce anti-eviction legislation. 56
A week later, the NSW Attorney General put before parliament the
Fair Rents and Lessees Relief Bill. 57 Though this was withdrawn, in
early August the government brought in the Ejectments
Postponements Legislation,58 followed by the Reduction of Rents
Act in October. 59 These two bills did not solve the problem - for the
unemployed still had no cash with which to pay their rent but they did provide a considerable amelioration.
Overall, the houses at Bankstown and Newtown were

defended at a terrible cost to the 34 pickets. All the men were
mercilessly beaten, some were shot at by police, and 16 would be
given gaol sentences of up to 18 months. How miserable it must
have been to find that within a month of the final battle, they were
being rapped over the knuckles by their own organisation. Now the
UWM Executive complained that at Bankstown and Newtown the
anti-eviction campaign had 'degenerated from mass work to
conspiratorial work'. The correct method was to 'mobilise the mass
of the workers in the neighbourhood in support of the tenant'.60
At heart, the story of this campaign raises the unanswerable
question about the correct balance between the role of the masses
and the role of the revolutionary vanguard. Certainly, the anti-eviction
campaign was successful because it was an expression of wide
community feeling. But would this community feeling have
developed if the pickets hadn't occupied the houses?
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